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In this chapter, I describe the assurance view of testimonial knowledge and 
warrant and consider a significant challenge to the view.  Excellent critical 
discussions of some earlier versions of the assurance view can be found in 
Lackey (2008, ch. 8) and Schmitt (2010).  Here, I will emphasize literature that 
has appeared since 2010.  Other recent critical discussions may be found in 
Shieber (2015, ch. 5) and Gelfert (2014, ch. 8). 
 
I. What is the assurance view? 
 
The assurance view is an epistemological position regarding testimonial 
knowledge and warrant.  It holds that I can acquire knowledge from other 
people in virtue of the fact that when they tell me things, they thereby assure 
me that what they say is true, and in so doing provide me with an entitlement 
to rely on their authority.  Suppose I am wondering whether Shakespeare’s 
diaries are in the library, my friend Frost tells me that they are not (without 
further explanation), and I think I come to have knowledge of this fact as a 
result.  On the assurance view, in such cases we may speak of a distinctively 
testimonial kind of epistemic warrant, based on the interpersonal act of 
assurance by which a speaker takes responsibility for the truth of what she 
says. Two theses are definitive of the assurance view: (I) acts of assurance are 
an important feature of testimony in our communicative practices; and (II) the 
practice of assurance allows for a distinctive and valid kind of epistemic 
warrant, and this is sometimes adequate to provide me with knowledge.  A 
significant strand of scholarship, going back to an early moment in the revival 
of philosophical interest in the topic of testimony, has argued for similar claims 
(Welbourne 1979, Ross 1986). 
 
A central goal of the assurance view is to provide an account of what is 
distinctive about testimonial warrant and knowledge.  This is sometimes 
expressed as the aim of drawing a distinction between the way we normally 
treat testimony that p as supporting p, and the way we treat evidence that p as 
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supporting p.  If I believe Frost, I do not take his claim as a form of evidence 
that Shakespeare’s diaries are not in the library, to be weighed in light of other 
evidence and experience.  In this way, the assurance view is fundamentally 
opposed to reductive accounts of testimony which ground it fundamentally in 
personal experience and/or inference. 
 
An important but infrequently discussed variant of the assurance view holds 
that assurance is closely tied to assertion itself and the norms governing 
assertion.  Many philosophers hold that when we make an assertion, we 
invoke epistemic norms such as the norm that a person must only assert what 
she knows or has sufficient reason to believe (Goldberg 2015). This seems to 
generate a sort of norm-based entitlement in the hearer of testimony to 
believe what is said (Faulkner 2011; Goldberg 2011, 2015; Nickel 2013).  Such 
views could be called norms of assertion views.  By contrast, a more frequently 
discussed type of assurance view holds that assurances are a recognizable 
subspecies of assertion, similar to a promise, in which one makes a real 
commitment that backs up the warrant (cf. Schmitt 2010: 220-221).  I will call 
these real commitment views. 
 
One of the key arguments for both norms of assertion and real commitment 
versions of the assurance view is based on the remarkable fact that if a person 
has formed a belief on the basis of an assurance and his belief is challenged by 
a third party, he may “pass the buck” by holding the original speaker 
responsible for the truth and justification of the belief.1  For example, if Macy 
challenges me to show that Shakespeare’s diaries are not in the library, I don’t 
necessarily have to look for my own evidence for this claim (e.g., in the card 
catalogue or the library stacks).  I can respond to her challenge by saying that I 
believe it because Frost told me so, passing the justificatory buck to Frost.  This 
shows both that the act of responsibility-taking is often assumed as part of our 
conversational practices, supporting (I), and also that this has an epistemic 
aspect (since the “buck” being passed is the onus of providing an epistemic 
justification sufficient for one’s claim to be maintained in the face of a 
challenge), supporting (II).  It is also claimed that reductive accounts of 
testimony cannot explain epistemic buck-passing, because these accounts                                                         
1 It could be that the meaning of buck-passing is a bit misunderstood.  Harry S. Truman famously had a placard 
on his desk that said “The buck stops here,” and he explained it in terms of the fact that he was ultimately the 
one who had to make difficult and uncertain decisions, rather than the fact that he possessed epistemic 
authority or had to provide a compelling justification after the fact.  The ‘buck’ in poker is said to point to that 
person whose turn it is to deal the cards, not who has to pay.  As Truman explained, “The President--whoever 
he is--has to decide. He can't pass the buck to anybody. No one else can do the deciding for him. That's his 
job.”  Farewell address, January 1953, as quoted at “‘The Buck Stops Here’ Desk Sign,” Harry S. Truman Library 
& Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/buckstop.htm, accessed 21 May 2016. 
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imply that the audience is fundamentally personally responsible for how (s)he 
treats testimony as evidence for a belief she acquires.  
 
The epistemic import of buck-passing is not immediately clear, but it can be 
understood such a way that it supports the warrant for the audience’s belief in 
what a speaker says.  The support for (II) could be further worked out as 
follows.  Since the speaker and the audience know about assurance and buck-
passing, the speaker will be aware that the audience may hold her accountable 
for the epistemic reasons for her claim, and (s)he will try to make sure only to 
make statements that are well-justified.  This increases the reliability of what 
the speaker says, and the audience can grasp this fact by thinking about the 
situation, giving them an extra epistemic warrant to believe what is said 
(Faulkner 2011, ch. 6; Goldberg 2015: chs. 2-3).  We can call this phenomenon 
“dependence-responsiveness” (Nickel 2012). 
 
Some assertions seem to involve no act of responsibility-taking, or generate no 
actionable rights.  For example, when a student makes an assertion on a 
written exam, or proposes an answer to a question posed in a classroom, (s)he 
is not generally supposing that others will use these assertions as definitive 
answers to open questions, no matter how much confidence (s)he has when 
answering.  Many versions of the assurance view hold that assurance is 
different in kind from mere assertion (Welbourne 1979: 5).  It is sometimes 
thought of as similar to a promise in that it has a specific recipient or recipients 
who come to have certain actionable rights as a result.   
 
There are two ways in which the real commitment variant of the assurance 
view can explicate an idea of assurance distinct from assertion.  The first 
corresponds to the content of the assurance, and the second to the parties 
whom the assurance relates.  First, we can distinguish a particular mode of 
epistemic responsibility-taking that is characteristic of assurance, in the sense 
that the content of what one takes responsibility for is epistemic.  Second, we 
can develop the idea that assurance has a distinctly second-personal character, 
so that, like promising, it relates specific persons.  It is given to a specific 
person or persons, the audience, who are to be distinguished from others, 
mere bystanders or eavesdroppers, who are not proper objects of the 
assurance and may not take advantage of it for knowledge and justification in 
the same way.  In the next two sections, I discuss these two ways of developing 
the real commitment view. 
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II. Assurance as epistemic responsibility-taking 
 
Krista Lawlor (2013) develops an account of assurance that is helpful in 
understanding what its particular character might be, as contrasted with 
ordinary assertion.2  She uses assurance to refer to cases in which one 
communicates ‘I know P’ instead of merely asserting P.  On her account, this is 
associated with a commitment by the speaker to “guarantee against 
reasonable alternatives” (10) in a way that is “good enough for anyone” (13) 
and is meant to end inquiry, at least provisionally.3  Mere assertions, by 
contrast, cover cases in which the speaker expects disagreement, such as when 
the committee chair states that “The federal stimulus package will reduce 
unemployment” (ibid.).  We might also add the cases of assertions made by 
students on an exam or in a classroom, discussed above.  Mere assertion is not 
meant to end inquiry or decide a question, and it issues no guarantee against 
reasonable alternatives. 
 
On this view, the distinctive epistemic properties of assurance make it suitable 
for the transmission of knowledge via testimony:4 assurance is distinctive in 
that it makes a claim to knowledge.  The point is not that one must have 
knowledge in order to transmit it.  That point, if it is even defensible,5 would 
give no special role to assurance in securing transmission.  For the assurance 
view, a role must be given to the assurance itself — as Lawlor understands it, 
the claim to knowledge — in the practice of testimony, and this role must be 
sufficient, under the right conditions, to provide knowledge in the audience.  
For that we need a further explanation of how this is supposed to create 
epistemic warrant in the audience.    
 
A speaker’s adding a mere verbal guarantee does not put the hearer in a better 
epistemic position, for the speaker could be lying, careless or incompetent.  It 
is only when the guarantee goes along with a particular epistemic and practical 
state in the speaker that the guarantee makes the hearer better off 
epistemically.  Consider an example from Lawlor, in which Henrik looks in the 
refrigerator and wonders if the leftovers there are still edible, and Serena                                                         
2 Nb. Lawlor’s interest is in developing the idea of assurance, rather than advancing the assurance view of 
testimony.  She remains agnostic about the latter. 
3 Here a reasonable alternative is, approximately, a possible state of affairs that would falsify the statement, is 
not obviously incompatible with the observed evidence, and is salient to reasonable people in the context. 
Ruling out reasonable alternatives is often held as a condition on knowledge. 
4 When I talk about “transmission” here, I am referring to a general phenomenon in which the speaker conveys 
knowledge to a hearer, not a rigid principle according to which testimonial knowledge always originates from a 
source who has knowledge (cf. Lackey 2008, ch. 2). 
5 Well-known challenges to this sort of idea can be found in Graham 2006: 112-113, Lackey 2008, ch. 2. 
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assures him that they are (Lawlor 2013: 19).  How can Henrik know on this 
basis that the leftovers are still edible (assuming he cannot verify the matter 
without taking a bite — perhaps his sense of smell is impaired)?   
 
Intuitively, it seems that for Henrik to get knowledge from Serena, he must 
also have reason to trust her, so that lies and incompetence are ruled out.  
Accounts of assurance are frequently paired with accounts of trust (Faulkner 
2011, Hinchman 2005; McMyler 2011).  There are two dimensions of the 
reasons for trusting somebody, corresponding to “external” and “internal” 
aspects of the trust relation.  The first dimension is that Serena is trustworthy, 
so that Henrik’s trust correctly represents real dispositions and capacities of 
Serena, which back up his trust.  The second dimension is that Henrik grasps or 
has access to reasons to believe or expect that Serena is trustworthy, so that 
his trust is suitably well-founded.   
 
Some accounts of trust and its epistemology play up the internal aspect of 
reasons for trust, emphasizing that the audience should have sufficient 
positive reason to set aside reasonable doubts about the motives and 
competence of the speaker. This is helpful for allowing audience greater 
control and (shared) responsibility, in terms of what beliefs they do or do not 
acquire through testimony.  The underlying idea is that trust should not be 
blind.  However, the grasp of reasons for trust must not then require 
unrealistic intellectual capacities.  Is this a realistic requirement on reasons for 
trust? 
 
Perhaps something like the following story would make this a realistic 
requirement.  In normal conditions, humans are sometimes capable of 
accurately representing the interests and practical reasons that would lead 
others to be trustworthy, and thus less prone to lie or be careless with the 
truth.  People are often highly sensitive to whether the interests of others are 
coincident or non-coincident with their own. This is bound up with the ability 
to construct a mental model of the intentional behavior of others in terms of 
their goals and interests, which is required for interpretive and predictive 
purposes in a social world.  (In everyday contexts we try not to rely too much 
on the assurances of those about whose interests we can make no such 
model.)  For those who are not equipped with such representational 
capacities, it may also be plausible to adopt a double standard about the 
basing dimension of trust in some contexts.  For example, one could hold that 
young children who trust their parents need not have a grasp of positive 
reasons for doing so in order for them to take advantage of the assurances 
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their parents give.  But sophisticated adults in a professional environment 
might be required to have such a grasp in order for their trust to be suitably 
based. 
 
On such a view, it seems as if the engine of testimonial justification is trust and 
trustworthiness, rather than assurance.  But in fact, the two elements work 
together, in a way broadly suggested by Hinchman (2012, 2014).  Consider a 
far-fetched variant of the case we have been considering which illustrates the 
point that without assurance, trust and trustworthiness alone are not sufficient 
for testimonial warrant.  Suppose that Henrik trusts Serena on an adequate 
basis, and that Serena is sufficiently trustworthy in the domain of their shared 
interactions.  Henrik has a technologically advanced brain-wave detector that 
can tell him some of Serena’s occurrent beliefs, and the detector now tells him 
accurately that her occurrent belief while looking at the leftovers is that they 
are still edible. Reading Serena’s occurent beliefs is surely different from 
hearing Serena make an assurance that the leftovers are still edible.  For if 
Henrik just reads Serena’s brain waves, he might not be able to reasonably 
conclude that the leftovers are really still edible.  Because of his different 
context or history, he might have different standards from Serena, either of 
edibility or what counts as sufficient evidence for edibility.  (Maybe he recently 
had food poisoning!)  But if Serena attunes her assurances to his standards, 
which often happens in ordinary talk, this barrier can be overcome.  The 
underlying idea is that when Serena provides an assurance, she is not merely 
reporting an occurrent belief.  She is representing herself “as helping him to 
know in the context of his epistemic needs, not merely in the context of her 
own” (Hinchman 2013, 618, pronouns changed).  This is, presumably, part of 
the commitment or responsibility she undertakes in assurance.  Conversely, 
this implies that even when Serena does not believe something herself, she 
can still rightfully assure Henrik of it, because she knows that it meets his 
standards.  In such a case, reading Serena’s brainwaves would not serve 
Henrik’s epistemic needs. 
 
To sum up: the real commitment view can be specified, in part, by explicating 
the distinctive content of epistemic responsibility-taking made in an assurance.  
Lawlor (op cit.) describes this as a commitment by the speaker to defend the 
testimonial claim against reasonable alternatives, and thereby to provide 
conclusive backing for a testimonial belief in the audience.  Such a 
commitment is of questionable value to an audience if they have no trust in 
the speaker; accounts of trust are, for this reason, often given alongside 
accounts of assurance.  However, these accounts may threaten to make the 
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role of assurance as a distinctive form of commitment-taking epistemically 
extraneous, because it is trust and the reasons for it, rather than a special kind 
of guarantee, that make it reasonable to believe what somebody else says. 
Hinchman’s (op cit.) account of how assurance plays a distinctive role in 
providing warrant — on which a speaker takes responsibility for adjusting what 
is assured to the epistemic context of the audience — helps respond to this 
worry. 
 
 
III. Assurance as person-to-person responsibility-taking 
 
Some philosophers see a crucial role for assurance, not merely in the 
distinctive kind of knowledge claim that it makes or in the way that it can be 
attuned to the epistemic context of the audience, but rather in the fact that 
assurance is a person-to-person act of responsibility-taking.  This “second-
personal” view of assurance, set out in detail by McMyler (2011), holds that 
assurance is expressed in an interpersonal speech act, telling, with an intended 
recipient. This type of view, building on the work of Welbourne (1979), Ross 
(1986), Moran (2005), and Hinchman (2006), is the one perhaps most often 
associated with the label “assurance view of testimony.”  
 
The second-personal character of assurance, according to McMyler, is to be 
explained in terms of the speaker’s act of assuming responsibility in relation to 
a specific audience. McMyler, applying Darwall’s (2006) account of second 
personal reasons, claims that a second-personal reason only has its force by 
being given by A to B and recognized by B as such, where A takes responsibility 
for giving the reason and is recognized by B as having the authority to do so 
(McMyler 2011, 145).  Applied to testimony, second-personality captures what 
is distinctive about testimonial justification. Testimonial assurance is given to a 
specific person or persons, the audience, who must recognize it as being given 
to them. Just as those who have merely overheard a promise are not in a 
position to demand its fulfillment, mere bystanders and eavesdroppers do not 
have the same warrant as the intended audience of an act of assurance, 
because they are not the ones to whom the relevant reason is given.  Whereas 
evidence is the kind of thing that is available to anybody who observes it as a 
reason for belief, testimonial assurance is only available to those to whom it is 
offered.  Others who witness the assurance but are not its intended audience 
may treat it as evidence, but they cannot treat it in the way it is offered to the 
intended audience, as expressing authority. 
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To see why this conception of assurance is attractive, let us briefly recapitulate 
the main argument for the assurance view.  The essence of testimonial warrant 
and knowledge lies in the fact that in testifying we offer an assurance to the 
audience.  This assurance consists of taking responsibility for the truth of what 
is said, which is to be understood in terms of one’s taking on the burden of 
having appropriate reasons for what one says, and being willing to produce or 
defend what is said when challenged. The justificatory role of assurance is thus 
conceptually linked with the phenomenon of epistemic buck-passing.  When I 
acquire a belief by relying on Frost’s testimony, and this belief is reasonably 
called into question, it seems appropriate to question or criticize Frost and not 
only me.  If Frost can’t produce the goods when challenged, he is to be 
criticized for speaking insincerely or without sufficient evidence.  In this way 
the “buck” of justification is passed to Frost and stops with him, unless of 
course he obtained his own information through testimony, in which case the 
call for justification may be carried back still further. 
 
McMyler’s theory suggests that only a view on which second-personal 
epistemic authority is offered and accepted can adequately explain the 
phenomenon of epistemic buck-passing.  If testimonial authority were reason-
giving but not second-personal, it would have to be in virtue of the evidence it 
provided for what was testified.  But in that case, the audience would be 
responsible for gathering this evidence itself.  Then it would also make sense 
for them to defend their testimonial beliefs themselves.  Epistemic buck-
passing would be difficult to explain or justify.  It is only in virtue of the act of 
responsibility-taking by the speaker, and the recognition of this by the 
audience, that transmitting requests for justification to the speaker becomes 
legitimate.  Reductive or evidential views of testimony cannot explain this 
phenomenon. 
 
As I see it, however, this important point need not imply that mere bystanders 
have no right to take up offers of testimonial authority, or to demand 
justification from the speaker if there are doubts about the statements made 
on the basis of that authority.6 
                                                         
6 McMyler appeals to the intuition that mere bystanders and eavesdroppers do not have the right of buck-
passing, to support the restriction of assurance-based warrant to the intended audience. Lawlor disputes this, 
holding that mere bystanders and eavesdroppers have the same rights of challenge as the intended audience 
(Lawlor 2013: 22). There is some empirical evidence for the hypothesis that mere bystanders and 
eavesdroppers are not ordinarily attributed the right of buck-passing (Turri 2015). However, one might explain 
this hypothesis in terms of privacy norms rather than epistemic factors: demanding justification from 
somebody who wasn’t speaking to you violates informational privacy (Nickel 2013).  It doesn’t have to do with 
warrant. 
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IV. The challenge to assurance views 
 
A persistent challenge for assurance views is that although they may capture in 
a satisfying way some key aspects of the phenomenology of relying on 
testimony, the fact that testifiers assume responsibility for what they say does 
not provide an adequate warrant for testimonial belief.  Put another way: even 
if the speaker’s assurance gives the audience the entitlement to believe what 
is testified from a conversational or moral point of view, this is far from 
adequately ensuring that the audience comes to have knowledge in so doing.  
Issuing such a guarantee is compatible with many plausible, non-hyperbolic 
scenarios on which the belief is false.   
 
Joseph Shieber describes this as a failure to satisfy a fundamental epistemic 
requirement, which he calls the “Adequacy Goal”: the goal of “maximiz[ing] 
the likelihood that the recipient believe a proposition only if that proposition is 
true” (2015, 5).  The assurance view seems to license belief-adoption that it 
should not license from this austerely epistemological point of view.  On the 
other hand, most beliefs, and certainly most testimonial beliefs, carry a non-
zero risk of being false.  Testimony adds a source of risk — other people — that 
can only be avoided completely by kicking away reliance on testimony 
completely.  This makes it clear that the best way of satisfying Shieber’s 
Adequacy Goal is to maintain no testimonial beliefs whatsoever.  This is absurd 
as a core principle of guidance in an epistemology of testimony.  A more 
adequate Adequacy Goal would start by acknowledging that I must form and 
maintain many of my beliefs on the basis of testimony, and that I should do so, 
if possible, in ways that reliably produce true beliefs.7  The more relevant form 
of the challenge, then, is this: assurance views, by licensing us to rely on 
assurances (at least in situations where we have reason to trust the speaker) 
on the basis of the speaker’s fundamental authority, endorse a form of 
testimonial belief-formation that does not reliably produce true beliefs.   
 
A concrete case helps to bring out the implications of the view more forcefully.  
In 2011, the Dutch social psychologist Diederik Stapel, dean of the School of 
Social and Behavioral Sciences at his faculty, was determined to have based 
much of his scientific work on fraudulent data (Bhattacharjee 2013). 
Colleagues and PhD students who had not themselves participated in the fraud 
had nonetheless collaborated with him on various studies and (prior to the                                                         
7 This is obviously different from a criterion for assessing whether a person has knowledge or conclusive 
warrant for a belief. 
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revelations about him) plainly believed many of his statements on testimony, 
without performing independent checks sufficient to reveal discrepancies in 
his account. After all, he satisfied reasonable criteria for trustworthiness: he 
was highly trained and experienced, his work had been vetted by scientific 
journals, and he had a reputation to defend.  His assurances had an excellent 
pedigree. 
 
Assurance views seem to tolerate or even endorse Stapel’s colleagues’ 
acceptance of his assurances, prior to the revelation of fraud.  But more 
importantly, they seem committed to the claim that any adequate account of 
testimony and testimonial belief must endorse such cases of acceptance.  If 
epistemologists require independent checks and verification in order to 
restrain testimonial belief and epistemic authority so that such reliance counts 
as epistemically unreasonable, this is equivalent to rejecting testimonial belief 
itself from the point of view of epistemology.  This seems to be a problematic 
commitment of the assurance view.  It seems more attractive to adopt a more 
modest view of the appropriate role of authority in testimonial belief, one on 
which warranted reliance on testimony in high-standards contexts (such as the 
modern practice of science) requires — and therefore must allow for — 
substantial independent checks and reasoning that would greatly diminish the 
role of assurance in our practices. 
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